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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

FELT SYNDICATE, INC.,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
— vs.—
HARTFORD ACCIDENT &
INDEMNITY COMPANY,
a corporation,
Defendant and Respondent.

Case
No. 8736

PETITION FOR REHEARING
Comes now the plaintiff and appellant, Felt Syndicate, Inc., and petitions this Honorable Court for rehearing in the above-entitled cause, and for an order vacating
the denial of the appeal of Felt and affirmance of the
judgment of the trial court with respect to the miscellaneous account assigned to Wright-Wirthlin Company
to secure the payment of a debt owed by Felt to WrightWirthlin. This petition is based upon the following
grounds:
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter1Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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1. The interpretation given Rule 54(c) (1) violates
the language of the rule, obviates responsive pleading,
nullifies Rules 2(c) and 12(h), ignores the "notice"
philosophy of the Rules, and provides a means whereby
a dilatory defendant may avoid a rightful judgment
against him.
2. The approval of the trial court's finding that Felt
Syndicate, Inc., is not the real party in interest is contrary to all the evidence and contrary to the language of
the written instrument of assignment. As a matter of
law, an assignment for security does not make* petitioner
an improper party incapable of pursuing the remedy for
itself and its assignee.
3. Even if amendment to include Wright-Wirthlin
as a party should be permitted, the amendment relates
back to the time of filing and Wright-Wirthlin is not
barred by the limitations in the bond.
Accompanying this petition and filed herewith is a
brief in support thereof.

Attorneys for the Appellant
We hereby certify that we are the attorneys for the
appellant, petitioner herein and in our opinion there is
good cause to believe that the judgment objected to is
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J.•2
Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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erroneous and that the case ought to be reexamined as
prayed for in said petition.
Dated this

day of June, 1958.

Woodrow D. White

C. Preston Allen

GENERAL S T A T E M E N T
In its decision affirming the judgment of the trial
court, based upon the default of Cassady, this Court established and acknowledged the right of Felt to recover
the damages flowing from that default; however, in disallowing the appeal of Felt, the Court permits the defendant to escape and avoid without payment the major part
of its obligation. Strong and cogent reasons should prevail in order to induce this Court to extinguish a substantive right after recognizing it; and we earnestly and respectfully submit that grave injustice is accomplished
through the denial to Felt of the right to recover the
major part of its contractual remedy from Cassady, because of technical defenses which were not supported by
the record and which were waived in the court below
through non-assertion by the defendant. This is not a
situation where because of the existence of a real party
in interest outside of the lawsuit the defendant is subjected to the risk of being required to pay its obligation
twice — it is rather a situation wThere the defendant is
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter3Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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relieved of the duty of paying a just obligation once, because of the unasserted and unproved defense that the
assignor of a claim for security only, contrary to the great
weight of ^authority, was not the real party in interest;
and the anomalous result of the holding is to deprive both
of the interested parties of any remedy at all. Despite
the fact that Hartford waived this defense by failing to
plead it, the Court reinstated the defense and declared
the major part of the action to be barred.
This holding is so contrary on three grounds to practically unanimous authority, including Utah law, that it
can only be viewed as an oversight on the part of the
Court at the conclusion of a factually difficult case.
The petitioner, Felt Syndicate, Inc., respectfully
urges the Court to reconsider its holding concerning
Felt's appeal in this cause, not only to prevent injustice
to petitioner, but also to preserve the integrity of the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure in future cases. Petitioner
submits new and additional authorities herein and prays
a reexamination of its brief on appeal, for we are firmly
convinced that the decision of this Court as it now stands
is contrary to the law and the evidence.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.

T H E A P P R O V A L OF T H E TRIAL COURT'S
FINDING THAT F E L T SYNDICATE, INC., I S
NOT T H E R E A L P A R T Y IN I N T E R E S T I S
CONTRARY TO ALL T H E E V I D E N C E AND
CONTRARY TO T H E LANGUAGE OF T H E

4
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W R I T T E N INSTRUMENT OF ASSIGNMENT.
AS A MATTER OF LAW, AN ASSIGNMENT
FOR SECURITY DOES NOT MAKE P E T I TIONER AN I M P R O P E R PARTY INCAPABLE OF PURSUING T H E REMEDY FOR
I T S E L F AND I T S ASSIGNEE.
The only evidence available indicates that Felt Syndicate, Inc., retained an interest in the chose assigned.
The actions of the parties, the language of the instrument and the present status of the obligation between
Felt and Wright-Wirthlin leave no doubt but that the
assignment was for purposes of security only. The instrument of assignment in the case at bar recites on its
face that it was the mutual intention of Felt and the
assignee to secure the obligation due the assignee by
Felt; and paragraph 5 of the instrument of assignment states that it is understood and agreed that nothing
therein contained shall be construed to waive or impair
any right which the assignee might have to the full and
complete debt. I t is, therefore, clear from the instrument itself that the assignment was not given in payment of a debt, but as security for it — the debt still
remained in the full amount, by the terms of the assignment itself. The evidence was therefore clear that the
assignment was for security only and there was no
evidence to the contrary. These facts are established
without controversy and are admitted by all parties to
the proceeding, and this Court goes beyond the evidence
in assuming that the lower court has adopted a finding
based upon non-existent proof to the contrary. This
Court states in its opinion that evidence which would
controvert a written instrument must be proved by clear
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter
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and convincing evidence and then decides that the
assignment leaves no property rights in the assignor
despite the language of the assignment itself, and despite the fact that there was no evidence to the contrary
It is true that the trial court erroneously ruled and
concluded from this evidence that the making of the
assignment for security only, as a matter of law, deprived Felt of the right to prosecute the claim as a real
party in interest. We strongly contend that to hold the
assignment as one for security does not controvert or
vary its terms, but reaffirms them.
The case of National Union Fire Insurance Co. v.
DSRGRR Co., 44 Utah 26, 137 P. 653, footnoted in the
Court's decision, is not contrary to any of the decisions
set forth in this brief. That case did not involve the
assignment of a cause of action for security only as in
the case at bar.
Petitioner does not disagree with the apparently
major premise of the court's syllogism, i.e., that a n
assignment for security gives the assignee standing to
sue on the obligation. However, the conclusion that such
an assignment therefore divests the assignor of such
right is not justified. Other courts have recognized this.
A case clearly in point is that of Turner v. New
Brunswick Fire Insurance Co., 45 N.M. 126, 112 P. 2d
511, from which we quote as follows:
"The plaintiffs meet the defendant's contention squarely on the merits. They make no claim,
as defendant seems to have anticipated, that the
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben
Clark Law School, BYU.
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policy provision stipulating a one-year limitation
period is void because it shortens the statutory
period of six years for commencing actions on
written contracts. We have held such a contention
is not well taken. Electric Gin Co. v. Firemen's
Fund Insurance Co., 39 N.M. 73, 39 P. 2d 1024.
They argue vigorously, however, that an assignment for security only leaves assignor the equitable and beneficial owner of the chose assigned
and that he still may maintain an action in his
own name as the real party in interest. In this
contention we think that plaintiffs are correct.
Stackpole v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co., 181 Cal.
700, 186 P. 354; Storm & Butts v. Lipscomb, 117
Cal. App. 6, 3 P. 2d 567; Globe & Rutgers Fire Insurance Co. v. Jewell-Loudermilk Co., 36 Ga. App.
538, 137 S.E. 286; Grubaugli v. Simon J. Murphy
Co., 209 Mich. 551, 177 N.W. 217; Louk v. Patten,
58 Idaho 334, 73 P. 2d 949; Ford Hospital v. Fidelity & Casualty Co., 106 Neb. 311, 183 N.W. 656;
Allen v. Protected Home Circle, 112 Kan. 576, 212
P. 95; Griffey v. New York Cent. Ins. Co., 100 N.Y.
417, 3 N.E. 309, 53 Am. Rep. 202; Lang v. Eagle
Fire Co., 12 App. Div. 39, 42 N.Y.S. 539; Mercantile Trust Co. v. Gimbernat, 143 App. Div., 305,
128 N.Y.S. 751; Collins v. McWilliams, 185 App.
Div. 712, 173 N.Y.S. 850. See, also, text discussions in 8 Couch on Insurance, Sec. 2056
and 6 C.J.S., Sec. 122, page 1169, under Assignments. * * *
•" (5, 6) I t is claimed the plaintiffs fail to meet
either of these tests. We think they meet both.
The assignments being for security only, the plaintiffs remained the beneficial owners of the right
to be enforced. At any given time, by paying to
the assignee named the debt due him, the plaintiffs could lift the pledge from so much of the proceeds of the policy as the amount stipulated in the
particular assignment. And, by aquiescing in the
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter
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maintenance of the suit by plaintiffs, a fact fully
established by reassignments from each assignee,
a judgment in plaintiff's favor or against them,
would be res adjudicata on the assignees. Camden Fire Ins. Ass'n v. Eckel, Tex. Com. App. 14
S.W. 2d 1020. Allen v. Protected Home Circle,
supra. The fact that the reassignments were executed more than a year after the fire would not
constitute the suit a new one by plaintiffs from
the time of such reassignments so as to bar the
right of action under the limitation period contained in the policy, if such reassignments were
deemed essential to make of plaintiffs real parties
in interest, contrary to our conclusion. Camden
Fire Ins. Ass'n v. Eckel, supra. If the defendant
felt that it required protection as against the
assignees, in the event the assignments were for
collateral, as they proved to be, it had the privilege of pleading a defect of parties, in that the
assignees were not joined. Collins v. McWilliams,
185 App. Div. 712, 173 N.Y.S. 850. And the statutes governing on intervention were open to assignees, had they not chosen to indicate their position through reassignments. Mountain Timber
Co. v. Lumber Ins. Co., 99 Wash. 243,169 P. 591."
The foregoing quotation shows a recognition of two
real parties in interest in a situation identical in principal with the case at bar, and each party is held to have
the right to pursue remedies for injuries to its special
property interest, and the New Mexico case cites numerous cases to the same effect; and, indeed, in our research
we have found no cases to the contrary.
A New York case cited by the New Mexico case is
that of Lang v. Eagle Fire Co., 12 App. Div. 39, 42 N.Y.S.
539, from which we quote as follows:
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben
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<<• # • <rpjie ^hird point urged upon the atten-.
tion of the court is that the plaintiff is not the
real party in interest, and, therefore, not entitled
to maintain this action. The evidence in the case
discloses the fact that, upon the day following the
fire, the plaintiff assigned to his mother all moneys
due and owing him, or to become due and owing
him, upon the policy in suit. But it further appears
that such assignment was not an absolute one, but
was intended merely as collateral to an indebtedness which the plaintiff owed his mother. And this,
of itself, would be a sufficient answer to the defendant's contention; for, if the plaintiff's right
of action against the defendant was pledged as collateral security merely, he undoubtedly retained
sufficient interest therein to entitle him to maintain
this action.' "
To the same effect is Louk v. Patten (Ida.), 73 P. 2d
948, where the judgment creditor assigned the judgment
to her attorney to secure payment of attorney's fees. In
that case the court said (page 951) :
" . . . The rule is stated in Uhlig v. Dief endorf,
53 Ida. 676, 26 P. 2d 801, 804, as follows:
" 'In the case of Globe & Rutgers Fire Insurance Co. v. Jewell-Loudermilk Co., 36 Ga. App.
538, 137 S.E. 286, we find the following:
" 'An assignor of a chose in action, who has
assigned the legal title thereto to another as security for a debt, has such an interest therein that he
may maintain a suit thereon in his own name. ' "
The Supreme Court of Michigan follows this same
principle in the case of Grubaugh v. Simon J. Murphy Co.
(Mich.), 177 N.W. 217.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter 9
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In Storm & Butts v. Lipscomb (Cal.), 3 P . 2d 567,
the plaintiff original contractors assigned the contract
as security; and they were held to be proper parties
plaintiff in an action against a subcontractor and surety
for breach of contract. The case cites several previous
California decisions to the same effect at page 571.
See also Griffey v. New York Central Insurance
100 N Y . 417, 3 N.E. 309.

Co.,

This Court, if it reversed the trial court's decision on
this point, would not be exposing the defendant to the
danger of paying its debt twice. The reassignment clearly
authorizes the judgment debtor to pay the full amount
of the claim to Felt — not that the reassignment revives a
stale claim in the hands of Wright-Wirthlin, as this
Court erroneously supposes; but on the contrary WrightWirthlin's right to participate in the recovery (had there
been no reassignment) was protected by the filing of the
suit by Felt within the limitation period contained in the
bond. This leads us into our discussion of Point II.
POINT

II.

E V E N I F AMENDMENT TO INCLUDE
W R I G H T - W I R T H L I N AS A PARTY SHOULD
. B E P E R M I T T E D , T H E AMENDMENT REL A T E S BACK TO T H E TIME OF F I L I N G
. . .AND W R I G H T - W I R T H L I N I S NOT BARRED
BY LIMITATIONS IN T H E BOND.
Even if the defendant's objection is allowed after the
trial is well under way, the amendment to join another
party should relate back to prevent injustice by the
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library,10
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running of limitations. The action was begun by Felt
for the use and benefit of itself and Wright-Wirthlin
and a subsequent amendment to include Wright-Wirthlin for the benefit of the defendant should relate back to
the filing of the complaint. Kansas Electric Power Co. of
Leavenivorth, Kansas v. Janis, 194 F. 2d 942; McDonald
v. Nebraska, 101 F. 171; American Fidelity & Casualty
Co. v. All American Bus Lines, 190 F. 2d 234. Again we
find no authority to the contrary.
In the New Mexico case, as appears from the quotation set forth above, there was a reassignment involved
after the limitation period provided for in the fire insurance policy, and the court held:
"The fact that the reassignments were executed more than a year after the fire would not
constitute the suit a new one by plaintiffs from
the time of such reassignments so as to bar the
right of action under the limitation period contained in the policy, if such reassignments were
deemed essential to make of plaintiffs real parties
in interest, contrary to our conclusion.''
In the light of these decisions we strongly urge that
this Court erred in concluding in its opinion that the claim
assigned as security to Wright-Wirthlin was barred by
limitations contained in the bond, and that such claim
could not be revived by reassignment to Felt; and we
earnestly implore this Court to reexamine its position in
this respect and to review the authorities cited in the
New Mexico decision, in order to determine whether the
position of this Court in the interest of justice should be
corrected.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter11
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POINT

III.

THE INTERPRETATION GIVEN RULE 54(c)
(1) VIOLATES THE LANGUAGE OF THE
RULE, OBVIATES RESPONSIVE PLEADING, NULLIFIES RULES 8(c) AND 12 (h),
IGNORES THE "NOTICE" PHILOSOPHY OF
THE RULES, AND PROVIDES A MEANS
WHEREBY A DILATORY DEFENDANT MAY
AVOID A RIGHTFUL JUDGMENT AGAINST
HIM.
Rule 54(c) is relied upon as giving the court the
power to reinstate a defense waived by the defendant
in that:
" . . . every final judgment shall grant the relief to which the party in whose favor it is rendered is entitled, even if the party has not demanded such relief in his pleadings. . . . "
In this case, relief was not granted the prevailing
party, as the rule permits, but rather to the defendant,,
against whom judgment was taken. We further find no
precedent for the conclusion that a party is entitled to a
reinstatement of a defense which he has waived under
Rule 12(h) by failing to present it. Even under the most
liberal view, the most that defendant was entitled to, as
will be later shown, was to have Wright-Wirthlin appear
as a party of record. Defendant was not entitled to a
release of its unpaid obligation.
;..;;

It has been consistently held by the federal courts
oinder the Federal Rules that Rule 17(a) (the real party
in interest rule) is for the benefit of the defendant and
the right to have the real party in interest on the record
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, 12
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as plaintiff is a right which may be waived by defendant.
McLouth Steel Corp. v. Mesta Machine Co., 19 F.K. Serv.
17 a.44, Case 1; National Garment Co. v. New York, Chicago & St. Louis R. Co., 173 F. 2d 32; Capital Fire Ins.
Co. v. Langhorne, 146 F. 2d 237. Where there has been
a partial assignment so that there are two parties in
interest, full recovery, impressed with a trust as to the
absent party, may be obtained by the plaintiff where
defendant makes no proper objection. Norwich Union
Fire Ins. Society v. Standard Oil Co., 59 F. 984; Fairgrieve et al. v. Marine Ins. Co. of London, 94 F. 686.
The only reason for preventing suit by a partial
subrogee alone is to preclude inconvenience and expense
to a defendant who might be required to defend a number of separate suits arising out of a single claim,
and hence defendant is the one who should make a timely
claim to join necessary parties. Yorkshire Ins. Co. v. U. S.,
171 F. 2d 374.
The real party in interest statutes are a mere convenience to the defendant, abrogating in some instances
the common law rule. To hold that by delay in asserting
a merely procedural right in himself a defendant may
rid himself of a substantive claim provides an inequitable
reward to an unfair litigant. The fact that Felt Syndicate
was a proper party to the litigation is sufficient to permit
judgment for the full amount.
If a timely motion had been made, Wright-Wirthlin
could have been joined as a party and this matter concluded. The issue was not raised until Felt had rested
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter13
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its case. Wright-Wirthlin did not enter the litigation
because of its interpretation of the assignment as one for
security only; it did not allow its claim to "become s t a l e "
for it looked to Felt for payment of its claim. Notice to
Felt that Hartford considered the assignment a breach
could in no way give notice that Hartford considered Felt
an improper party as to a portion of the debt.
Under this " l i b e r a l " interpretation of the rules, the
court may reinstate any defense which the defendant has
waived and the provisions of Rules 2(c) and 12(h) have
no significance.
The court ignored in its opinion the only Utah case
precisely in point, Fritz v. The Western Union Telegraph
Co., 25 Utah 263, 71 P. 209, which holds:
" T h e objection that the plaintiff in an action is not
" t h e real party in interest," as required by our
Code, when available by way of defense, must be
raised by answer or it will be considered to have
been waived."
The Utah Rules did not change this concept. The
holding is contrary to the law of all jurisdictions available to research.
A N S W E R TO H A R T F O R D ' S P E T I T I O N
FOR R E H E A R I N G
Hartford's petition for rehearing, its brief and
argument, conveniently and consistently fail to discuss
in what manner the trial court has erred in its findings
of fact and decree and tenaciously clings to reiterating and
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re-arguing controverted facts which have heretofore been
resolved against it. We do not believe a re-argument of
the facts would be helpful to the Court, but, in answer
to Hartford's petition, would incorporate here by reference the applicable portions of our original brief and the
briefs of able counsel for Prudential.
We deem it appropriate to draw to the attention of
the Court the fact that Hartford has impliedly confessed
the rightfulness of this Court's opinion on the points
raised in its petition through the absence of citations
evidencing precedents in support of its position, with the
exception of the subsidiary issue of the forfeiture of
Felt's rights to do an intrastate business. The citation
made by Hartford relates to entirely different statutory
provisions existing in a foreign jurisdiction and is not
inconsistent or contradictory to this Court's decision.
CONCLUSION
By reason of the facts and principles asserted in the
foregoing brief, we, therefore, respectfully conclude that
the fundamental principles of justice and equity require
that this Court reconsider its judgment in this matter
and grant unto the appellant, Felt Syndicate, Inc., a rehearing and a reversal of the judgment of the trial court
with respect to the amount of damages in accordance with
Felt's appeal.
Respectfully submitted,
WOODEOW D. WHITE
C. PEESTON ALLEN
Attorneys for Appellant
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